# EC TALKS

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#### Office 365 & Azure Active Directory: 10 Security Actions to Take Now

Sean Metcalf Microsoft Certified Master Founder & CTO, Trimarc Security LLC



TEC 2020 in Atlanta

The live in-person AD and Office 365 training of the year!

November 17-18, 2020



#### www.TheExpertsConference.com

Hybrid Active Directory Security

Office 365

Migration and Modernization




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### ABOUT

- Founder Trimarc (Trimarc.io), a professional services company that helps organizations better secure their Microsoft platform, including the Microsoft Cloud.
- Microsoft Certified Master (MCM) Directory Services
- Microsoft MVP
- Speaker: Black Hat, Blue Hat, BSides, DEF CON, DerbyCon, Shakacon, Sp4rkCon, TEC, Troopers
- Security Consultant / Researcher
- AD Enthusiast Own & Operate <u>ADSecurity.org</u> (Microsoft platform security info)



### AGENDA

- Introduction
- Azure AD & Office 365 Common Attacks
  - Password Spray
  - Password Reuse/Breach Replay
  - Consent Abuse
- Securing Azure AD & Office 365: Security Actions to Take Now
- Conclusion



Azure AD & Office 365 Common Attacks



# Common Attacks: Password Spray



### AD Recon vs Azure AD Recon

#### On-Prem AD

AD user can enumerate all user accounts & admin group membership with <u>network access</u> to a Domain Controller.

#### Azure AD

Azure AD user can enumerate all user accounts & admin group membership with <u>access to</u> <u>Office 365 services (the internet by default)</u>.


User enumeration\* often possible without an account!



### Azure AD User Enumeration

Office 365 Authentication Page (Python) [Account Discovery]	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/LMGsec/o365creeper</u></li> </ul>
OWA (Golang)	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/busterb/msmailprobe</u></li> </ul>
ActiveSync (Python)	<ul> <li><u>https://bitbucket.org/grimhacker/office365userenum/src</u></li> </ul>
MSOnline/AzureAD PowerShell Module (PowerShell)	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/nyxgeek/o365recon</u></li> </ul>





### Password Spraying

Ruler (Exchange) [Golang]	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/wiki/Brute-Force</u></li> </ul>
SprayingToolkit (Lync/Skype for Business/OWA) [Python]	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SprayingToolkit</u></li> </ul>
LyncSniper (Lync/Skype for Business) [PowerShell]	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/mdsecresearch/LyncSniper</u></li> </ul>
MailSniper (OWA/EWS) [PowerShell]	<ul> <li><u>https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper</u></li> </ul>

Legacy Authentication enables O365 Password Spraying Legacy = Outlook =<2010, POP, IMAP, SMTP, etc

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#### Attacking the Cloud: Password Spraying


#### PS C:\> C:\temp\Spray-0365.ps1

#### + FullyQualifiedErrorId : PositionalParameterNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.ImportModuleCommand

[\*] Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx [\*] Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:01:04 [\*] Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 [\*] A total of 0 credentials were obtained. Results have been written to C:\temp\owa-sprayed-creds.txt. [\*] Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx [\*] Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:01:35 [\*] Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 [\*] SUCCESS! User:theacme.io\thrawn@theacme.io Password:Summer2019! [\*] A total of 1 credentials were obtained. Results have been written to C:\temp\owa-sprayed-creds.txt. [\*] Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx [\*] Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:01:58 [\*] Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 [\*] A total of 0 credentials were obtained. Results have been written to C:\temp\owa-sprayed-creds.txt. [\*] Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx
[\*] Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:02:21
[\*] Trying Exchange version Exchange2010
[\*] A total of 0 credentials were obtained. Results have been written to C:\temp\owa-sprayed-creds.txt. [\*] Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx [\*] Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:02:44

#### Attacking the Cloud: Password Spraying

Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:01:35 Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 SUCCESS! User:theacme.io\thrawn@theacme.io Password:Summer2019! A total of I credentials were obtained. Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:04:26 \* Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 \* SUCCESS! User:theacme.io\obiwan@theacme.io Password:TheForce19 A total of i credentials were obtained. Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:04:03 Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 SUCCESS! User:theacme.io\bobafett@theacme.io Password:Mandalorian19! A total of I credentials were obtained. Now spraying the EWS portal at https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx Current date and time: 08/02/2019 04:05:34 **\*** Trying Exchange version Exchange2010 \* SUCCESS! User:theacme.io\bailey@theacme.io Password:Password1 \* **\*** A total of I credentials were obtained.





8/1/2019, 9:09:12 PM	Thrawn	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:11 PM	Qui-Gon Jinn	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:11 PM	Lando Calrissian	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:07 PM	Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:06 PM	obi-wan Kenobi	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:06 PM	leia	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:06 PM	Rey	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:06 PM	kylo	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:01 PM	Padme Amidala	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:01 PM	Luke Skywalker	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	
8/1/2019, 9:09:01 PM	Bailey	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	*Azure AD Sign-in Logs
8/1/2019, 9:09:00 PM	Han Solo	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	require Azure AD Premium
8/1/2019, 9:09:00 PM	Adm Ackbar	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	(P1 or P2) TEC The Experts Conference Source by Quest
8/1/2019, 9:08:53 PM	Finn	Office 365 Exchange On Failure	52.168.138.234	TALKS THE Sports Conference.com

Acme Corporation - Sign Azure Active Directory	-ins				
↓ Download 🔅 Export Data Sett	ings 🗙 Troubleshoot 👌 Refresh 🛛 🗮 Colum	nns 📔 🂙 Got feedback?			
8/2/2019, 12:03:47 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied		
8/2/2019, 12:04:34 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied		
8/2/2019, 12:01:43 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied		
8/2/2019, 12:03:15 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied		
/2/2019, 12:08:21 AM	Boba Fett	Office 3	865 Exchange	Online	Failure
/2/2019, 12:02:06 AM	Boba Fett	Office 3	865 Exchange	Online	Failure
/2/2019, 12:04:11 AM	Boba Fett	Office 3	865 Exchange	Online	Success
8/2/2019, 12:07:35 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied	** *	o
8/2/2019, 12:08:21 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied		Sign-in Logs
8/2/2019, 12:02:06 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Failure	52.168.138.234	Not Applied	(P1 or P2)	Ure AD Premium
8/2/2019, 12:04:11 AM Boba Fett	Office 365 Exchang Success	52.168.138.234	Not Applied	(1 ± 01 1 2)	TEC TALKS

Basic info	Device info	MFA info	Conditional Access	Troubleshooting and support		
Request ID	8e270d9b-9d	lc4-41c5-9273	3-e69395680400		IP address	52.168.138.234
Correlation ID	94558595-8e	cc-484b-b7a6	5-6eaaa3e9d74e		Location	Washington, Virginia, US
User	Boba Fett				Date	8/2/2019, 12:02:06 AM
Username	bobafett@the	eacme.io			Status	Failure
User ID	5688de1a-10	ec-4b5c-b98c	d-73cff3c2e7f0		Sign-in error code	e 50126
Application	Office 365 Ex	change Online	e		Failure reason	Invalid username or password or Invalid on-premise username or passwor
Application I	0000002-00	00-0ff1-ce00-	-00000000000		Client app	Other clients; Older Office clients

#### Sign-in error code 50126

Failure reason Invalid username or password or Invalid on-premise username or password

Client app

Other clients; Older Office clients

Legacy Authentication



# Common Attacks: Breach Replay



### Password Reuse/Replay

Our team is currently looking into reports of stolen passwords. Stay tuned for more.

#### ✦ Reply ♣ Retweet ★ Favorite

30f8c8134437da0c0232eeca20bd7992c00bce74: df272dfef6127aeaecc5c47c7ceed028c39354df: c886b08ad18cd650b1bc4a7612a0742a2257a41e: bd01669b5883f24ebe55930efeb098fb5a873d96: ef60e1915933c7c5abde3cb160f45bf1963e3525: 991db9efcfa06ae837a4d433b6ba2777256e1af8: 4b757d2f8f7036f8119739e4b82bc27875f4a987: 13a7bc6d3d74dcc5533d0a756a7b9bf4f1b46c7d: a4404ac0b635faa6264658fc960836a308427c90: 546684e9d6d2f217db45229b4fa63c5d51f26729: 54cd6a7aaf905ac2145942f65a03fa7c54cf3ea9: fb88038b760bc428e4847831aad572339c2e8ecd: c06bbe76b5dfa96cb8c0351a227f30b8f1a3109a: a067d0f502613bc845b31c70b6882ae91ed27a2c;



hansolo@theacme.io lukeskywalker@Plus.com

112.HanSolo113.LukeSkywalker

hansolo lukeskywalker LeiaIKnow19! TheForce19

### Password Reuse/Replay Detection

#### Password Hash (of the AD Hash) Sync Enabled: Users with Leaked Credential Report

<u>HavelBeenPwned.com</u>			Preview)		
			cure Score		
';have i been pwned?		<ul><li>Conditional Access</li><li>MFA</li></ul>			
(;na\	📩 Users flagge				
		Risk events			
Check if you have a	an account that has been compromised in a data breach	Authenticat	tion methods		
Domain name	enter the domain you'd like to search				
Subscribe me		RISK LEVEL	DETECTION TYPE	RISK EVENT TYPE	RISK EVENTS CLOSED
Notification email	enter your email address	High	Offline	Users with leaked credentials <b>()</b>	2 of 2



# Common Attacks: Consent Abuse



### Consent Abuse



Users fooled into granting permissions to an app that looks like a familiar app.

FireEye PwnAuth




MDSec Office 365 Toolkit




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#### Illicit Consent Grant Attack: MDSec O365 Attack Toolkit



https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/07/introducing-the-office-365-attack-toolkit/

#### Illicit Consent Grant Attack: Pawn Storm



#### **Enterprise App Permissions**

- Enterprise App (tenant-wide) permissions can be granted by Admins.
- Ideal persistence technique since app permissions not reviewed like group membership.



sean@theacmeio.onmicrosoft.com

#### Permissions requested Accept for your organization



This app would like to:

- $\checkmark$  Read and write all applications
- $\checkmark$  Read and write directory data
- V Use Exchange Web Services with full access to all mailboxes
- $\checkmark$  Read and write calendars in all mailboxes
- $\checkmark$  Read and write contacts in all mailboxes
- $\checkmark$  Read and write all user mailbox settings
- $\checkmark$  Read and write mail in all mailboxes
- $\checkmark$  Send mail as any user
- $\checkmark$  Read all users' full profiles
- $\checkmark$  Sign in and read user profile


If you accept, this app will get access to the specified resources for all users in your organization. No one else will be prompted to review these permissions.

Accepting these permissions means that you allow this app to use your data as specified in their terms of service and privacy statement. You can change these permissions at https://myapps.microsoft.com. Show details

#### **Enterprise App Permissions**

This app would like to:

- Read and write all applications
- Read and write directory data
- Use Exchange Web Services with full access to all mailboxes
- Read and write calendars in all mailboxes
- Read and write contacts in all mailboxes
- Read and write all user mailbox settings
- Read and write mail in all mailboxes
- Send mail as any user
- ✓ Read all users' full profiles
- Sign in and read user profile





# Security Actions to Take Now



# Limit Global Admins (2 to 4)

"Report" Accounts Should use Global Reader



# Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for All Role Admins

Global Admins First, Preferably with Microsoft Authenticator App (no SMS/text)



# Use Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM)

Requires Azure AD P2 for Accounts using PIM (only)



## 1. Control Role Groups with PIM

#### **Global Admin**

Privileged Role Admin

User Admin

Security Admin

Authentication Admin

**Application Admin** 

**Conditional Access Admin** 

These roles can control Office 365 admin accounts/groups/system. List is not comprehensive. TheExpertsConference.com



## 2. Control Service Admin Roles with PIM

### Exchange Admin

### SharePoint Admin

### Teams Admin

### Skype for Business Admin

### Intune Admin

These roles control Office 365 services & can access data. List is not comprehensive.



#### Identify Role Group Membership

# Sample PowerShell Code. Provided without warranty or support. Import-Module AzureAD Connect-AzureAD

```
$AzureADRoleGroupReport = @()
ForEach ($AzureADDirectoryRoleItem in $AzureADDirectoryRole)
{
     $RoleGroupMembers = @()
```

[array]\$RoleGroupMembers = Get-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId \$AzureADDirectoryRoleItem.ObjectId

```
Write-Output "Azure AD Role $($AzureADDirectoryRoleItem.DisplayName)
Membership ($($RoleGroupMembers.Count) members):"
    $RoleGroupMembers | % {$_.UserPrincipalName}
    Write-Output " "
}
```

#### Discovered 18 Active Azure AD Roles

Azure AD Role Application Administrator Membership (0 members):

Azure AD Role Device Administrators Membership (0 members):

Azure AD Role Intune Service Administrator Membership (2 members): sean@trimarcrd.com DevAdmin@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Device Managers Membership (1 members):

Azure AD Role Security Administrator Membership (1 members): sean@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role SharePoint Service Administrator Membership (2 members): DarthVader@TrimarcRD.com exadmin@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Privileged Role Administrator Membership (1 members): sean@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Teams Communications Support Specialist Membership (0 members):

Azure AD Role Global Reader Membership (3 members): TrimarcMCSA@trimarcrd.com sadiki@trimarcrd.com scottb@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Exchange Service Administrator Membership (1 members): exadmin@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Directory Writers Membership (1 members):

Azure AD Role Billing Administrator Membership (0 members):

Azure AD Role Lync Service Administrator Membership (1 members): exadmin@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Conditional Access Administrator Membership (0 members):

Azure AD Role Teams Communications Administrator Membership (1 members): exadmin@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Teams Service Administrator Membership (2 members): BobaFett@TrimarcRD.com exadmin@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Security Reader Membership (1 members): TrimarcMCSA@trimarcrd.com

Azure AD Role Company Administrator Membership (2 members): sean@trimarcrd.com jason@trimarcrd.com

### Secure Global Admin Authentication



Create & Use Dedicated Admin Accounts for (Office 365) Administration



#### Require MFA (& PIM)



Use Cloud Admin Workstations



Configure for FIDO2 authentication



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Configure 2 Emergency "break-glass" Global Admin Accounts



#### 1 should be excluded from MFA.



1 should be excluded from Conditional Access policies.



Both should have a FIDO2 key configured for authentication (in safe).



Audit logon activity.

# Protect Azure AD Connect Server (& ADFS) like a DC

AAD Connect Service Account is Highly Privileged in Azure AD & AD



### **Azure AD Connect Server Location**

PS C:\> get-aduser -filter {samaccountname -like "MSOL\*"}`
-prop DistinguishedName,description | fl \*

Description	: Account created by the Windows Azure Active Directory Sync tool with installation identifier 'trd977930921' running on computer 'AZURESYNC' configured to synchronize to tenant
	'theacmeio.onmicrosoft.com'. This account must have directory replication permissions in the local Active
	Directory and write permission on certain attributes to enable Hybrid Deployment.
DistinguishedName	: CN=M50L_trd977930921,0U=Service Accounts,DC=theacme,DC=io
Enabled	: True
GivenName	
Name	: MSOL_trd977930921
ObjectClass	: user
ObjectGUID	: cdcb6dd0-65e2-40bc-bc60-461408831036
SamAccountName	: MSOL_trd977930921
SID	: 5-1-5-21-143179592-3749324205-2095737646-1138

PS C:\> get-adcomputer AzureSync

DistinguishedName DNSHostName	CN=AZURESYNC,OU=Servers,DC=theacme,DC=io
Enabled :	True
ObjectClass :	AZURESYNC computer
	42f88cbe-c51f-4f5c-9059-58d3449a7a30 AZURESYNC\$



# Ensure Azure AD Connect is Running the Current Version

6 versions released in 2019. Versions older than 18 months will be deprecated.

Import-Module MSOnline Connect-MsolService (Get-MsolCompanyInformation).DirSyncClientVersion



# Review Application Permissions & Consent



### **Review Tenant-Wide Permission (Admin) Consent**

#### Permissions

	Applications can be granted permissions to your directory by an admin consenting to the application for all users, a user consenting to the application for him or herself, or an admin integrating an application and enabling self-service access or assigning users directly to the application.									
	As an administrator you can grant conse when using the application. Click the bu		y, ensuring that en	d users will not be requirec	l to consent					
SS	Grant admin consent for Wingtip Toys									
	Admin consent User consent									
(Preview)	$\wp$ Search permissions									
	API NAME		↑↓ ТҮРЕ	↑↓ PERMISSION LEVEL <sup>↑</sup>	`↓ GRANTE <sup>↑</sup> ↓					
	MICROSOFT GRAPH									
	Microsoft Graph	Have full access to user calendars	Delegated	Medium	An administ					
	Microsoft Graph	Have full access to user contacts	Delegated	Medium	An administ					
	Microsoft Graph	Read Microsoft Intune apps	Delegated	Medium	An administ					
	Microsoft Graph	Read and write Microsoft Intune a	ops Delegated	High	An administ					

#### Security

#### Conditional Access

A Permissions

Token encryption (Preview)

### **Review Per-User Permission (User) Consent**

User consent								
15							User(s)	
	↑↓ PERMISSION	$\uparrow_{\downarrow}$	ТҮРЕ	$\uparrow_{\downarrow}$	PERMISSION LEVEL $\uparrow \downarrow$	GRANTE ↑↓	, ♀ Search	by name or email
'n	Sign users in		Delegated		Medium	15 total us		Caleb Baker calebb@wingtiptoysonline.com
h	Sign in and read user profile		Delegated		Low	7 total use		Rajat Luthra
'n	Read and write access to user pro	ofile	Delegated		Unknown	14 total us	0	rluthra@wingtiptoysonline.com
h	Read all users' basic profiles		Delegated		Low	14 total us		
'n	Read and write access to user ma	il	Delegated		High	14 total us		
h	Read and write user and shared r	nail	Delegated		High	3 total use		
			<b>D</b> I . I					



### Audit App Permissions with PowerShell

.\<u>Get-AzureADPSPermissions.ps1 |</u> Export-Csv -Path "permissions.csv" -NoTypeInformation

Review both:

- Delegated permissions (OAuth2PermissionGrants)
- Application permissions (AppRoleAssignments).



\*Courtesy of Philippe Signoret

Review output, especially:

- consents that are of ConsentType of 'AllPrincipals'.
- discrete permissions that each delegated permission or application has
- specific users that have consents granted. If high profile or high impact users have inappropriate consents granted, you should investigate further.
- ClientDisplayName for apps that seem suspicious.

https://gist.github.com/psignoret/41793f8c6211d2df5051d77ca3728c09



# Enable Security Defaults

Security defaults is a set of basic identity security mechanisms recommended by Microsoft. When enabled, these recommendations will be automatically enforced in your organization. Administrators and users will be better protected from common identity related attacks.

Enable Security defaults Yes No

*If Not Currently Leveraging Conditional Access Policies* (Enabled on Tenants Created after Oct 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2019)



## Security Defaults

- Enforces MFA for 9 highly privileged roles.
- After users complete MFA registration, they will be prompted for MFA if Azure AD needs to confirm authentication.
- Legacy Authentication is Blocked.
- Access to the Azure Portal, Azure PowerShell, or Azure CLI requires MFA (users who are not registered will be required to register).
- MFA for Security Defaults is always the Microsoft Authenticator. Conditional Access is required to support other (Azure AD) MFA types.
- Don't use Security Defaults with Conditional Access.



### Leverage Conditional Access Policies

Limit/Disable Legacy Authentication Enforce MFA for Role Members

2

Restrict Access to Office 365 Services & SAAS Apps

3



# Monitor Azure AD & Office 365 Logs

Pull Logs into Existing SIEM or Leverage Azure Sentinel



# Review Microsoft Secure Score

Work on "Quick Wins" – items with low user impact & low effort.



#### **Microsoft Secure Score**

(i) Microsoft Secure Score has made some updates to your available improvement actions. Learn more

Explore new features and give feedback on Microsoft Secure Score's updated experience, in preview now! Try the preview version

**Overview** Improvement actions History

Your secure score

History

#### Total score: 116 / 303

Microsoft Secure Score analyzes the protection state of your identities, data, devices, apps, and infrastructure.

Identity	111 / 203
Protection state of your Azure AD accounts and roles	
Data	5 / 35
Protection state of your Office 365 documents	
Device	No data to show
Protection state of your devices	
Apps	0 / 65
Protection state of your email and cloud apps	
Infrastructure	No data to show
Infrastructure Protection state of your Azure resources	No data to show

#### • 0 points in 30 days

Total score  $\, \smallsetminus \,$ 

Your secure score over time and how you compare to other organizations.



View history



#### Actions you can take to improve your Microsoft Secure Score. Score updates may take up to 24 hours.

#### $\downarrow$ Export

15 items  $\,\,\,
ightarrow\,\,$  Search  $\,\,\,\,
ightarrow\,\,$  Filter  $\,\,eq\,\,$  Group by  $\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,$ 

Applied filters: Status: Not completed imes

Improvement action	Rank 🛈	Score	Category	User impact	Implementation cost	Portal	Status	Notes
Require MFA for administrative roles	1	25/50	Identity	Low	Low	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Enable Password Hash Sync if hybrid	9	0/10	Identity	Low	Low	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Ensure all users can complete multi-factor authenti	12	9/30	Identity	High	High	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Enable self-service password reset	20	0/5	Identity	Moderate	Moderate	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Do not allow users to grant consent to unmanage	35	0/10	Identity	Moderate	Low	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Apply IRM protections to documents	41	0/5	Data	Moderate	Moderate	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Delete/block accounts not used in last 30 days	51	0/1	Identity	Moderate	Low	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Apply Data Loss Prevention policies	54	0/20	Data	Moderate	Moderate	Microsoft Information	• Not completed	-
Set automated notifications for new OAuth applica	57	0/20	Apps	Moderate	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	• Not completed	-
Enable policy to block legacy authentication	68	0/20	Identity	Moderate	Moderate	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed	-
Set automated notifications for new and trending	75	0/15	Apps	Moderate	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	• Not completed	-
Create a custom activity policy to discover suspicio	80	0/10	Apps	Moderate	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	• Not completed	-
Discover trends in shadow IT application usage	82	0/5	Apps	Low	Moderate	Microsoft Cloud App S	• Not completed	-
Use Cloud App Security to detect anomalous beha	107	0/15	Apps	Low	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	• Not completed	-
Turn on customer lockbox feature	127	0/5	Data	Moderate	Moderate	Exchange Online	• Not completed	-

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(i) Microsoft Secure Score has made some updates to your available improvement actions. Learn more

Explore new features and give feedback on Microsoft Secure Score's updated experience, in preview now! Try the preview version

Overview Improvement actions History

Actions you can take to improve your Microsoft Secure Score. Score updates may take up to 24 hours.

⊥ Export						15 items 🔎 Search	$iggraphi$ Filter $\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$
Applied filters: Status: Not completed $ imes$				User impact			
Improvement action	Rank 🛈	Score	Category	User impact 1	Implementation cost	t Portal	Status Notes
Require MFA for administrative roles	1	25/50	Identity	Low	Low	Azure Active Directory	Not completed -
Enable Password Hash Sync if hybrid	9	0/10	Identity	Low	Low	Azure Active Directory	Not completed -
Discover trends in shadow IT application usage	82	0/5	Apps	Low	Moderate	Microsoft Cloud App S	Not completed -
Use Cloud App Security to detect anomalous beha	107	0/15	Apps	Low	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	Not completed -
Enable self-service password reset	20	0/5	Identity	Moderate	Moderate	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed -
Do not allow users to grant consent to unmanage	35	0/10	Identity	Moderate	Low	Azure Active Directory	Not completed -
Apply IRM protections to documents	41	0/5	Data	Moderate	Moderate	Azure Active Directory	Not completed -
Delete/block accounts not used in last 30 days	51	0/1	Identity	Moderate	Low	Azure Active Directory	<ul> <li>Not completed -</li> </ul>
Apply Data Loss Prevention policies	54	0/20	Data	Moderate	Moderate	Microsoft Information	Not completed -
Set automated notifications for new OAuth applica	. 57	0/20	Apps	Moderate	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	Not completed -
Enable policy to block legacy authentication	68	0/20	Identity	Moderate	Moderate	Azure Active Directory	<ul> <li>Not completed -</li> </ul>
Set automated notifications for new and trending	75	0/15	Apps	Moderate	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	<ul> <li>Not completed -</li> </ul>
Create a custom activity policy to discover suspicio	. 80	0/10	Apps	Moderate	Low	Microsoft Cloud App S	<ul> <li>Not completed -</li> </ul>
Turn on customer lockbox feature	127	0/5	Data	Moderate	Moderate	Exchange Online	<ul> <li>Not completed -</li> </ul>
Ensure all users can complete multi-factor authenti	. 12	9/30	Identity	High	High	Azure Active Directory	• Not completed -

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### Other Regular Review Items

- Review Microsoft 365 Security Center reports https://security.microsoft.com/homepage
- Review Exchange Forms/Rules for potentially malicious settings. <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack?view=o365-worldwide</u>
- Review Illicit Consent Grants

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/detect-and-remediate-illicit-consent-grants?view=o365worldwide

• Review Exchange Online mailbox permissions for unusual/unintended configuration (Get-ExoMailboxPermission)

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/powershell-v2-module/get-exomailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps



### Office 365 Security Checklist

- 1. Limit Global Admins to <5.
- 2. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for All Role Admins.
- 3. Use Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM).
  - 1. Control Role Groups with PIM
  - 2. Control Service Admin Roles with PIM
- 4. Secure Global Admin Authentication.
  - 1. Separate Admin Account
  - 2. Require MFA
  - 3. Use Cloud Admin Workstations
  - 4. Configure for FIDO2 authentication
- 5. Configure 2 Emergency Global Admin Accounts.
- 6. Protect Azure AD Connect Server like a DC.
- 7. Ensure Azure AD Connect is Running the Current Version.
- 8. Configure Security Defaults OR Conditional Access policies.
- 9. Review Application Permissions & Consent.
- 10. Monitor Azure AD & Office 365 Logs.
- 11. Review Microsoft Secure Score
- 12. Determine if Tenant Restrictions makes sense.

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> www.ADSecurity.org TrimarcSecurity.com



### References

- Protect Global Admins <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/enterprise/protect-your-global-administrator-accounts</u>
- Admin Roles in Office 365
   <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/users-groups-roles/directory-assign-admin-roles">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/users-groups-roles/directory-assign-admin-roles</a>
- Review Role Membership in the portal
   <u>https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft\_AAD\_IAM/ActiveDirectoryMenuBlade/RolesAndAdministrators</u>
- Azure PIM documentation <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/privileged-identity-management/</u>
- Review PIM configuration <u>https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft\_Azure\_PIMCommon/ResourceMenuBlade/quickstart/resourceId//resourceType/tenant/p</u> <u>rovider/aadroles</u>
- Create 2 emergency (break-glass) administrator accounts
   <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/users-groups-roles/directory-emergency-access</u>
- Protect Azure AD Connect like a DC <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-install-prerequisites</u>
- Ensure Azure AD Connect is running the current version <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-version-history</u>
- Azure AD Permissions Review Script <u>https://gist.github.com/psignoret/41793f8c6211d2df5051d77ca3728c09</u>
- Azure AD Security Defaults <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/concept-fundamentals-security-defaults</u>
- Configure Tenant Restrictions <u>https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/new-enhanced-access-controls-in-azure-ad-tenant-restrictions-is/ba-p/245194</u>
- FireEye PwnAuth <u>https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/05/shining-a-light-on-oauth-abuse-with-pwnauth.html</u>
- MDSec Office 365 Toolkit TheExpertsConference.com <u>https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/07/introducing-the-office-365-attack-toolkit/</u>



# EC TALKS

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